

# MR Letters

Letters to *Military Review* should be sent to 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or to milrev@leavenworth.army.mil, and should not exceed 500 words.

## Understanding Hamas

Ms Chong Yee Ming, *Librarian, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore*—I refer to Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein's Review Essay, "Hamas: Understanding the Organization," published in the July-August 2003 *Military Review*. While arguing the righteousness of the Islamist cause of liberating Palestine, it is important to understand Hamas's inner workings. Heavily modeled on the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has created community services while maintaining military wings that carry out suicide bombings.

## An Unconventional War

LTC Rosser Bobbitt, *U.S. Army, Retired*—In Major Thomas S. Bundt's article, "An Unconventional War: The Philippine Insurrection, 1899," in the May-June 2004 *Military Review*, he presupposes the Civil War as the experience base of the Army going into the Philippines. He seems to miss completely the Army's experience in America's Indian Wars, in which it used many of the same tactics and procedures Bundt says the Army leaned toward in the Philippines.

## Bundt's Reply

MAJ Thomas S. Bundt, *U.S. Army, Ph.D.*—I would like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Rosser Bobbitt for his insight. I completely agree that the Army's involvement in the Native American campaigns did produce strong examples of select guerrilla-warfare experiences. However, even if the earlier Native American campaigns had been used as the basic building blocks for training the Army of 1898 in guerrilla-warfare tactics, textbooks related to the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection from 1898 to 1907 do not

consider the two to be that similar. For example, a direct quote from John E. Jessup, Jr., Robert W. Coakley, and James Lawton Collins's text, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* [University Press of the Pacific, Honolulu, HI, 2000], in relation to operations in the Philippines, states, "This irregular warfare, far different from what the Army had known against the Indians, raised new problems of bringing the enemy to terms."

A host of rationales for this particular position vary, from dissention within the United States in conducting these operations, to the actual conduct of cooperation and amity between the Filipinos and the Americans at the conclusion of hostilities. Another example is derived from Andrew J. Birtle's book *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* [Diane Publishing Co., Collingsdale, PA, 1998], which states, "From the frontier, the men who directed the operational level of the Philippine War brought with them a mindset that was accustomed to conducting small-unit constabulary operations from dispersed posts and that encouraged adaptability, individual initiative, and aggressiveness. These attributes contributed much more to the Army's success than did the transference of any specific techniques of Indian-fighting or prairie field craft, few of which could be directly applied in the Philippine's tropical jungles. By blending old concepts with techniques adapted to the situation at hand, the old frontier Army successfully adjusted to the demands of overseas constabulary service."

As these statements attest, there is relevance for the Native American campaigns experience, but this is not indicative of the established techniques used in the Philippine insur-

rection that then paves the way for future operational doctrine. In a sense, all the lessons provide some insight; the tragedy is, these experiences were rarely documented, and the Army has had to rely heavily on the memories of its soldiers to preserve many of the lessons from the war, just as it had during the earlier Native American campaigns. In the continuing hope to prevent repeating the same mistakes, the article was meant to cement some past insight into present thought.

## Kudos to Paparone

LTC Stewart A. Underwood, *Commander, Mountain Warrior Recruiting Battalion, Beckley, WV*—Please pass on to Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army, that his article, "What is Joint Interdependence Anyway?" in the July-August 2004 *Military Review*, was great, tremendous! I have sent the article to a dozen other battalion commanders and command sergeant majors and to each of my subordinate commanders!

## Additional Information on Sea-Basing

Mike Weaver, *Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS*—Major Henry B. Cook has done a good job gathering facts for his article, *Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)*, in the July-August 2004 *Military Review*. His description of the requirements for a Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) (Future) (F) is particularly good. However, I think it would be helpful to address some key concepts that are misleading. I would also like to provide additional sources of information.

Cook correctly identifies sea-basing as an enabler of U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) concepts. One concept—Objective Ma-

neuver from the Sea (OMFTS)—was developed in response to future threats along the littorals, which are characterized by large cities, well-populated areas, and the intersection of trade routes. A USMC concept paper, “Operational Maneuver from the Sea: A Concept of Naval Power Ashore” [no date given], states, “What distinguishes OMFTS from other maneuver concepts is the extensive use of the sea by the commander to gain an advantage while avoiding disadvantageous engagements such as opposed amphibious landings.” [See on-line at <www.dtic.mil/jv2010/usmc/omfts.pdf>.]

Cook’s statement that OMFTS’s goal is to place a combat force in the Threat’s rear is misleading. The concept paper continues, “The enemy rear area may be an area the commander chooses to interdict; however, as previously discussed, OMFTS is a means of gaining advantage, an avenue for friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy, and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements.”

Cook also states that the basis of sea-basing is the implementation of the MPF. Understanding what the sea-base is composed of, and what the MPF is, will help the reader understand how the two are integrated. The sea-base is far more complicated than [simply] forward-deploying equipment and supplies aboard ships. The sea-base includes weapons systems, ships, aircraft, logistics, information systems, cargo handling, and transportation networks.

Sea-basing is also not solely a USN/USMC concept; it is a joint concept. The Defense Science Board (DSB) identified sea-basing as a “critical future joint capability . . . that replaces or augments the fixed, in-theater airports and seaports, on which past military operations have focused and depended, with a maneuverable facility at sea so a commander can exploit enemy weakness.” [Department of Defense, DSB Task Force on Sea-Basing, Memorandum for the Commander, 14 August 2003.]

Also, MPF is not three squadrons of forward-deployed ships. What Cook is describing is Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships (MPS), which is part of MPF. And, when it is joined with the Marine air-ground task force, a Navy Support Element, and naval coastal warfare ships, MPS provides the commander with a rapidly deployable, integrated combat team capable of short-term sustainment. When employed, the MPF can form a part of the sea-base that supports the overall force.

The following websites provide a more complete understanding:

- Sea-basing, <www.usni.org/proceedings/articles03/proseabasing01.htm>.

- OMFTS, <www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/seabasing.pdf>.

- MPF, <www.dtic.mil/jv2010/usmc/omfts.pdf>.

- Navy, <www.msc.navy.mil/pm3/

### Cook’s Reply

MAJ Henry B. Cook, *U.S. Army National Guard, Laurel, MS*—

I would like to thank Mike Weaver for providing additional insight, comment, and clarification to my article “Sea-Basing and the Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (Future).” I am familiar with the USN/USMC concepts that are espoused in *Seapower 21*. The “rear” I refer to is represented on a nonlinear battlefield, which is anywhere a Threat is not or does not expect *you* to be. In essence, ship-to-object maneuver (STOM) is a “deep operation” in legacy terms. Weaver is correct in saying the sea-base concept encompasses all the vessel assets in an offshore or littoral area of operation, not just the MPF or MPF(F).

When I originally wrote the paper, open-source literature considered sea-basing a completely naval concept. The DSB paper on sea-basing, dated 14 August 2003, was not available in open source until December 2003. However, I do agree with the DSB’s report that says the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force (USAF) should provide “meaningful participation” in developing a joint sea-based concept by sharing the responsibility and the cost. In late June 2004, the Pentagon approved the initiation of a Sea-Basing Joint Integration Concept that will (hopefully by the end of 2004) integrate the Joint Force Command and the USN/USMC concepts. [See John T. Bennett, “Fusing Concepts will culminate in Joint Sea-basing Capability Plan, *Inside Pentagon* (12 August 2004).] I am delighted that sea-basing is now considered a joint

*continued on page 120*

## Corrections (July-August 2004)

On the contents (page 1), byline (page 50), and biography (53) of the article “Will We Need a Space Force?” Major Richard D. Moorehead’s service affiliation should have been listed as U.S. Air Force.

In the same issue, a line on page 95 of Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein’s Review Essay, “Islamic Militant Cells and Sadat’s Assassination,” should read, “Faraj viewed Egypt’s Christians as plotting to establish a separate state in the southern Egyptian province of Qina and looked on their collection plates

as a means of financing their vision.” Also, Aboul-Enein is with the Medical Service Corps, not the Military Sealift Command.

The title of Major Gregory A. Daddis’s July-August 2004 article should read, “Understanding Fear’s Impact on Unit Effectiveness.” In the section titled “Combating Fear,” on page 24, lines 4-6 should read, “Dave Grossman’s book *On Killing* is replete—perhaps overly so—with the costs that the expectation to kill entails.” Note 36 on page 27 should read, 36. Ibid.

In the “The Recognition-Primed Decision Model,” by Karol G. Ross, Gary A. Klein, Peter Thunholm, John F. Schmitt, and Holly C. Baxter, the book title in Klein’s biography should read, *Intuition at Work*. Schmitt is a former major in the U.S. Marine Corps. The article was prepared through collaborative participation in the Advanced Decision Architectures Consortium sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory under the Collaborative Technology Alliance Program.